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Data Management Issues for Emerging Diseases
Since 1976, when Legionnaires’ disease af-
fected attendees at the American Legion Conven-
tion in Philadelphia (1), the scope of public health
has expanded. During the 1976 outbreak investi-
gation, public attention was drawn to news ac-
counts of the increasing numbers of cases and
deaths as well as to speculations about diseases
causes and prevention. After the outbreak, public
health officials contended with volumes of infor-
mation, including clinical data, epidemiologic
survey results, and records of specimens collected
from patients and the environment. This informa-
tion was managed on mainframe computers.
In 1980, a cluster of cases of unrecognized
illness, primarily affecting young women, created
a data management situation similar to that sur-
rounding the Legionnaires’ disease outbreak. A
major epidemiologic investigation, which included
examining a multitude of laboratory specimens
and analyzing volumes of data, was undertaken
by a large team of federal, state, and local public
health officials, as well as numerous academic
institutions and private industries. The problems
with establishing databases and implementing a
data management system for toxic shock syn-
drome (2) were essentially the same as the data
management problems of Legionnaires’ disease,
except that computer technology had crept for-
ward slightly in public health offices.
During the spring of 1993, a cluster of cases of
another unknown illness, eventually attributed
to hantavirus (3), occurred in the southwestern
United States. The reaction to this unknown dis-
ease by public health officials reflected a startling
fact: even though the epidemiologic and labora-
tory methods for curtailing the outbreak were in
place, a consistent data management strategy
had not been established. Ad hoc databases built
by outbreak investigators for a multitude of pur-
poses began to bog down the investigation. Cases
were recorded in multiple databases that did not
recognize duplicate reports of cases. Updates of
data about cases were done in some, but not all,
databases. Laboratory data about specimens
from patients were not linked to other clinical and
epidemiologic data about a patient. No single
database was available with well-edited, com-
plete data about all the cases. Parallel, frag-
mented data management efforts evolved in at
least 15 locations, with no coordinated mecha-
nism to integrate them into one system.
Introducing a single system for data manage-
ment in the midst of the hantavirus outbreak
involved more than the data management issues
encountered in the earlier outbreaks. Previously,
computer technology was viewed as a solution
that, although somewhat cumbersome, enabled
officials to move from data management by hand
to electronic management. However, during the
hantavirus outbreak, computer technology be-
came part of the problem; it initially prevented
good data management and may have hindered
some of the laboratory and epidemiologic efforts
to control the outbreak. Data were essentially
being locked into various databases and could not
be adequately analyzed or merged with data in
other databases. In some instances, this peculiar
circumstance caused investigators to perform
analyses by hand using printouts from electronic
databases or entering data again into other sys-
tems.
In recent years, legal considerations, such as
the Privacy Act enacted in 1974 and the Freedom
of Information Act enacted in 1966 (4,5), have also
complicated data management. These acts, in
their efforts to protect individual privacy and
ensure availability of data, have in some cases,
constrained public health responses to emergency
situations and subsequent surveillance efforts by
enforcing strict database design and handling
requirements.
Data Management Requirements
In epidemiologic investigations, disease prob-
lems are generally characterized by person, place,
and time, whether the problem concerns the
emergence of a new disease, a change in the
resistance pattern of a known pathogen, an emer-
gency response to an outbreak, or a routine
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data gathering, management, and analysis are
essentially the same for all these purposes. Com-
puter systems developed to manage data associ-
ated with these problems should be regarded as
tools for the epidemiologic characterization of
pathogens, syndromes, cases, and risk factors.
Therefore, laboratory data management and re-
porting systems must be able to handle data
about all of these.
The most stringent requirements for data
management are imposed by data from labora-
tory testing of specimens from patients, human
and nonhuman sources, and the environment. A
system having a relational data model adequate
to properly handle the laboratory data require-
ments will almost certainly be adequate to handle
the clinical, exposure, and demographic data re-
quirements.
Two primary data management functions can
satisfy the laboratory data demands with multi-
ple requirements in each function. The first func-
tion, internal laboratory data management,
consists of entering test results and tracking
specimens. The second, surveillance, includes
gathering data and moving data beyond the elec-
tronic files of the laboratory to appropriate sites
for analysis. A data management system should
be able to perform these functions not only during
an outbreak but throughout the period of surveil-
lance as well.
The internal laboratory function, universally
similar among most public health laboratories,
includes data entry tailored for individual labora-
tories at the site; retrieval/query ability; and abil-
ity to add or delete tests, manage aliquots, share
data input in different laboratories of the site,
track the status of every specimen regardless of
which laboratory tested it, develop reports for
specimen submitters, and in some cases assign
costs for laboratory tests performed and prepare
invoices for submitters. 
Requirements for the surveillance function in-
clude, in addition to certain critical laboratory
data, the following facilities: to record clinical,
exposure/risk factor, and demographic data about
patients; to include data about multiple speci-
mens and aliquots related to the same person,
regardless of the interval separating the
specimen dates; and to change questions or test
results that are recorded for each specimen.
Although internal and surveillance functions
are clearly separate, they are not independent.
Data entered into databases for the internal func-
tion should be available without additional effort
for the surveillance function. In fact, when the
internal function is not electronic or when the
internal electronic system is inadequate, the sys-
tem performing electronic surveillance should
also perform to some extent the internal func-
tions. Good laboratory data management does not
address the internal function at the exclusion of
the surveillance function. 
If a laboratory data management system is to
be useful for emergency situations, it must pro-
vide mechanisms for adapting quickly  to the
emergency situation. For example, it must pro-
vide a way to immediately create an electronic
data collection instrument and to incorporate this
new instrument into the system at all reporting
sites electronically. For the surveillance function,
these electronic features must include communi-
cations facilities to move data electronically from
one location to another, mechanisms for sending
messages or files, functions for simple analysis,
and methods for preparing and printing reports.
While some systems perform some of these func-
tions, most systems do not provide all of them. 
With appropriate systems in hand, data man-
agement plans for both urgent and routine events
can be approached in a sequential fashion. With
consensus among all participating investigators,
epidemiologists must decide what data (both
laboratory and epidemiologic) are needed so that
data field characteristics can be defined. Consen-
sus should be reached in the early phase of the
outbreak investigation; otherwise participants in
the investigation will of necessity begin develop-
ing ad hoc data management systems. The more
thoroughly and carefully this task is performed,
the more stable the data will ultimately become.
In a well-designed system, the initial defini-
tions in an emergency situation can include pro-
jections about which data fields will be needed.
However, for routine surveillance these can be
more thoroughly planned. Thus, the data system
should allow fields to be deleted if not needed and
to be added if they become important. These
modifications should 1) be handled without hav-
ing to alter the system, 2) use simple menu-driven
functions requiring no computer programmer
intervention,  3)  accomplish the changes
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without disrupting their other functions during
the investigation, and 5) be incorporated auto-
matically.
Next, all known participants in the investiga-
tion must be identified. These should include
local, state, and federal officials as well as aca-
demic or private participants who may provide
reports to the central data repository. These par-
ticipants must be identified to the system specifi-
cally by person and by site for system security.
Appropriate state and federal offices should be
informed concerning the computer system and
the rules for its use well before an emergency
occurs; therefore, sites will be on the system in
advance of an urgent problem. However, the sys-
tem must allow for additional sites to be added
quickly. In an emergency, a temporary agreement
must be drawn for all participants to cooperate
with the demands of the situation, i.e., to use a
particular software system and operate under a
standard set of rules for collecting and reporting
data for the emergency. This agreement may oc-
casionally stipulate that participants share data
temporarily in a common database for the sake of
data integrity.
Entering clinical, epidemiologic/risk factor,
and laboratory data about the same cases into the
same database, rather than merging separate
databases after the data are collected, provides
such great payoffs in time savings and data integ-
rity that the effort to obtain cooperation for a
common database during an urgent situation is
worthwhile. Although merging multiple data-
bases during routine surveillance is feasible,
emergency situations do not lend themselves to
this type of data management. Therefore, the
system to be used for these situations must ac-
commodate a common database and provide a
means of connecting the reporting sites to the
database. When the reporting system is activated
and data begin arriving at a central location, the
system should facilitate analysis at every report-
ing site and provide a mechanism to export data
(e.g., ASCII or .dbf files) for external analysis.
Emergency situations create unusual de-
mands for epidemiologic and laboratory re-
sources; therefore, data management should not
disrupt or threaten to divert resources devoted to
these other purposes. As the system is imple-
mented, before emergencies occur, discussions of
the resources required should be held with
participants. Participants must devote some re-
sources to data management, but these should be
minimized. This is consistent with implementing
a single system in the beginning of the outbreak
investigation and continuing with it into the rou-
tine surveillance follow-up. Incorporating data
into a second system for surveillance could waste
resources.
Although, internal data management does not
need to change to accommodate an outbreak,
laboratories must implement systems that can
directly feed data into the master reporting sys-
tem database, either through an import function
contained in the master system or by a direct
interface between the internal laboratory system
and the surveillance reporting system.
Data management considerations during out-
break investigations and surveillance in the
United States include the political concerns of the
participants. Political and legal constraints of all
participants must be addressed before the need
to deal with them arises. On a global scale, this
consideration is equally important, especially in
countries whose economies may be adversely af-
fected by news of a dangerous disease situation.
Individual country sovereignty must not be vio-
lated by data reporting, and the cooperation of
each participating country or political entity (e.g.,
World Health Organization [WHO], Pan Ameri-
can Health Organization [PAHO]) must be ob-
tained in an atmosphere of confidentiality. All
attempts to obtain, share, or combine data on a
regional or global basis must include a well-de-
fined set of rules agreed upon by all participants.
For example, data for scientific purposes might be
received at an office of  WHO or PAHO but not
sent beyond these organizations.
Most often, for the sake of surveillance on a
regional or global scale, data management consid-
erations must focus first on establishing in-coun-
try data management infrastructures. This
means that regional or global surveillance will
first translate into establishing a master system,
or at least compatible systems in individual par-
ticipating countries. In most cases, data manage-
ment systems available to developing countries
do not provide the relational model needed by the
laboratory. Therefore, efforts should be initiated
to introduce and establish systems that can meet
these needs in countries desiring to use them.
A plan for regional or global surveillance must
include tools to respond to outbreaks and provide
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other means of transmitting the data electroni-
cally. Today’s environment demands that most
data management be done on personal computers
located at critical sites where data can be input.
However, data volume may ultimately require
that the system provide for archiving data onto
another medium. This does not preclude the use
of personal computers for data management but
simply recognizes that current technology limits
the volume of data that can practically be man-
aged and analyzed on personal computers.
The initial data management plan for a coun-
try should include a section on reporting proce-
dures and the appropriate medium for archiving
data. To handle an immediate, urgent situation
the system should contain, at a minimum, a per-
sonal computer with large hard-disk capacity (at
least 1-2 gigabytes at the central level and possi-
bly 300-500 megabytes at each reporting site),
large memory (at least 4 megabytes of RAM at
every reporting site), adequate speed (at least 33
megahertz at every reporting site), and fast mo-
dems if appropriate. For sites located in areas
with inadequate telephone lines, other provisions
for electronic transmissions should be planned
(e.g., diskettes). Until security can be assured on
the Internet, we do not recommend using this
medium for electronic transmission of laboratory
clinical data for outbreak investigations and sur-
veillance.
New Tools for the Management of Surveillance and
Laboratory Data
The Public Health Laboratory Information System
(PHLIS)
To address the need for a data management
system for outbreak investigations and surveil-
lance, the National Center for Infectious Dis-
eases, CDC, in cooperation with the Association
of State and Territorial Public Health Laboratory
Directors in the United States, developed PHLIS.
With this system, data entry screens (modules)
are created and distributed to all reporting sites
electronically, and data are input and reported
within hours, without involving computer pro-
grammers. PHLIS provides the capacity for a
hierarchical reporting scheme involving reports
to multiple, successively higher reporting levels;
a database is created at every reporting level so
that all data reported to a site or input at the site
are included in the database at that site.
The most recent version of PHLIS (Version
3.0), is a menu-driven system based on a rela-
tional data model sufficient for the needs outlined
in the first part of this report. The system allows
for a patient record to be input only one time and
links multiple specimens for that patient record.
This is true even if specimens for the same patient
are entered in different disease modules, or if the
patient’s name is to be added into a module that
contains only epidemiologic data (no laboratory
specimens). PHLIS provides a core set of data to
be collected on every patient. In addition, each
disease module can be customized by adding ad-
ditional fields to the core data if needed. The
system can accommodate data for epidemiologic,
laboratory, survey, and case-control studies, and
for other public health needs.
Field staff can rapidly add their own data fields
to existing disease modules to customize the data
entry for special needs at each data reporting site.
During an outbreak, a new module can be rapidly
developed and electronically transmitted to all
participating reporting sites.
The system, which includes data communica-
tion software, is configured so that data flow in a
pyramid reporting structure: that is, data are
reported from lower level reporting sites through
higher level reporting sites and ultimately to a
single central site. As data are passed to each
successively higher level, they are automatically
assimilated into that site’s database. Thus, data-
bases are built and updated at successively
higher reporting sites. Additional information
about a case or specimen may be added at any
reporting site; if desired, these additional data
are also transmitted to the next higher reporting
site.
To meet the need for feedback, PHLIS has a
menu-driven option to transmit files or messages
up and down the reporting chain, with these files
and messages being transmitted automatically
when connections are established for each data
transmission. This facility is flexible enough to
allow any valid user in the reporting chain to
transmit files or messages to any other user in the
reporting chain. For example, in the United
States, a county health official who is included in
the reporting system in one state can send mes-
sages or files to a participating county official in
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mimic electronic mail because these files and
messages are sent along the reporting chain in
the same communications configuration as data
reporting. Therefore, successful arrival of these
messages at their destination(s) depends upon
each member of the reporting chain between the
sender and the receiver to establish a connection
for reporting purposes. However, the system pro-
vides an alternative mechanism for sending files
and messages directly to any other reporter hav-
ing the capacity to receive them without going
through the reporting chain.
PHLIS is used in all 50 state public health
laboratories, as well as the District of Columbia
and Guam. Disease modules included are animal
rabies, Campylobacter, Escherichia coli O157:H7,
Lyme disease, mycobacteria, respiratory and en-
teric viruses, human Salmonella, nonhuman Sal-
monella, Shigella, and drug-resistant Strepto-
coccus pneumoniae.
PHLIS can be implemented independently: or-
ganizations can develop their own PHLIS pyra-
mid reporting system. For example, PHLIS is
currently being implemented at the Caribbean
Epidemiology Center (CAREC) in Trinidad and in
its member countries for the reporting of
HIV/STD infections with the expectation that the
reporting system will be expanded to accommo-
date other diseases. CAREC can receive reports
from the member countries as each country is
added to the reporting structure.
Laboratory Information Tracking System (LITS)
The second system, LITS, is a PC local area
network-based system for tracking laboratory
specimens. The system allows specimen informa-
tion to be entered at a central specimen receiving
site; additional information about the specimen
can be entered into the system in any of the
laboratories performing tests on that specimen.
Although modules are customized for each labo-
ratory’s needs, laboratorians can add additional
tests or delete obsolete ones. Furthermore, users
can examine all the data about a specimen, in-
cluding data from all laboratories that performed
tests on the specimen. Other features in the sys-
tem include cost billing, user defined reports, user
defined query, and specimen or patient tracking
and security. For emerging diseases, LITS pro-
vides a mechanism to standardize laboratory pro-
tocol across organizations and a mechanism to
share data about specimens within an organiza-
tion.
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